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Rebranding a Federation: Insights from the UK Co-operative Movement 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper details the rebranding process undertaken by the UK co-operative movement and 
provides an understanding of the strategic issues involved in maintaining a coherent brand 
identity across a group of autonomous independent societies. The methodology uses previously 
unpublished and archive material from across the movement. This is followed by a series of 
structured interviews with Board Directors, senior management and individuals responsible for 
implementing the rebranding strategy. The rebranding exercise took almost ten years and the 
research identifies nine (non discrete) overlapping stages. The paper argues that while many 
parallels with can be drawn with the corporate rebranding literature, the need to achieve 
compromise and consensus combined with the independence of those participating, creates 
issues not detailed in previous academic studies. 
 
Summary Statement of contribution:  
This paper attempts to make an original theoretical contribution to the academic literature by 
arguing that "Federal Rebranding" is a form of rebranding not identified or discussed in any 
previous study. Through case evidence, it illustrates the different stages involved in the 
rebranding process, details some of the practical difficulties and problems associated with 
undertaken such an exercise and may assist practitioners in future rebranding activities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
‘There is no point in hiding behind another name – we are the co-op, we should be 
proud of it and shout about it from the house tops.  The new co-op symbol will have the 
merit of simplicity and directness.  It will be sufficiently distinctive to indicate that it is 
new and will have built into it the factor of value and quality that should relate to the 
name co-op itself. The straightforward ‘Co-op’ mark will at once identify the product as 
being not just another C.W.S. product but as a society’s own house brand.’ 
Source: Philip Thomas Chief Executive of the C.W.S. (Co-op News; 9
th
 
September 1967). 
 
Co-operatives are trading enterprises that are wholly owned and controlled by their membership
i
. 
It is estimated that there are almost 5,500 such organisations in the UK with more than 12.8 
million members and employing in excess of 236,000 people (Co-operatives UK, 2011).  These 
enterprises range from small independent fish farms to the world’s largest consumer co-
operative, (The Co-operative Group (tCG)) who operate across a variety of market sectors 
(including retail, banking, travel and funeral care) (Co-operative Group,  2011).  Despite its 
scope and scale, since 1945 the movement has experienced falling membership and a reduction 
in the number of organisations operating under co-operative principles
ii
 (Walton 2009).  
 
As will be illustrated, numerous reasons have been put forward to account for the decline of co-
operatives as competitive trading enterprises, while at the same time a variety of solutions have 
been suggested that seek to reverse the fortunes of the movement. One (of the many) 
recommendations to be put forward has been the need to establish a distinct brand identity for the 
co-operative movement as a whole.  This suggestion partially stems from the fact that it is a 
federal movement comprised of a series of independent, autonomous societies loosely bound 
together under a series of common values.  While opportunities do exist to work together or 
share resources (for example, all UK food buying is centralised in one location), there remains 
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no obligation on any society to participate or collaborate.  While a number of previous attempts 
had been made to develop a coherent and consistent brand identity across the movement, overall 
these initiatives had met with only partial or limited success. This is despite significant academic 
research having identified that a discernible brand identity can offer companies distinct 
competitive benefits (Aaker 1996; Dias and Ryals 2002; Harris and de Chernatony, 2001; Urde 
1999).   
 
Between 2001 and 2009 the co-operative movement undertook a rebranding strategy that 
involved a holistic assessment of each element of its marketing and communications strategy.  
This extended beyond a simple re-badging exercise and store revamp programme to include a 
more fundamental evaluation of how the movement delivered its portfolio of products and 
services to the customer.  In this sense, it involved a reconfiguration of many business processes 
and functions including a reassessment of its supply chain and merchandising operations. 
 
The objective of this paper is two-fold.  First, it will detail the rebranding process undertaken by 
the co-operative movement.  This provides an understanding of the different tasks and activities 
involved in such an exercise.  Through empirical research, the findings are able to categorise 
each activity into a series of (non-discrete, overlapping) stages. Secondly, having identified the 
process, the case evidence aims to contribute to the growing conceptual body of knowledge 
relating to rebranding.  While reinforcing findings from previous studies, this paper provides an 
insight into the issues that arise when attempting to develop a unifying brand across a federal 
organisational structure.  
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In so doing, this paper also helps rectify the identified lack of ‘practice orientated’ research into 
the study of marketing. It has been argued that an understanding of how marketing is actually 
undertaken in an organisation requires ‘bottom up’ empirical research and one that acknowledges 
the importance of human actors and their actions in marketing theory (Jarzabkowski and Spee 
2009; Svensson 2007).  As Järventie-Thesleff et al (2010) maintain, there is a need to move away 
from a focus upon the content and processes of strategy formulation towards an understanding of 
how brand strategies are managed within an organisation. A strategy in practice approach is 
predicated on the assumption that brand strategies are conducted by numerous practitioners and 
that empirically grounded research provides practical managerial guidance (Järventie-Thesleff et 
al 2010; Skålén, 2009; Skålén and Hackley, 2010). This paper will attempt to focus upon the 
actual praxis of rebranding and aim to illustrate that the human element is neither limited to the 
actions of senior management or the routines of practitioners (Jarzabkowski and Spee 2009; 
Skålén and Hackley, 2010).  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A number of commentators maintain that the area of corporate rebranding remains well 
documented in the trade journals (Muzellec and Lambkin, 2006), but relatively under researched 
as an academic subject (Gotsi and Andriopoulos, 2007; Merrilees and Miller, 2008; 2011; 
Palmer 2004).  Plewa et al (2011) argue that those studies that have been undertaken remain 
fragmentary and exploratory in nature. Moreover they estimate that under a dozen detailed 
scholarly studies of corporate rebranding have been undertaken which partly accounts for the 
limited theoretical base upon which these enquiries are founded.  Despite this however, it has 
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been argued that the concept of rebranding occupies a distinct conceptual position within the 
literature and that an understanding of the issues involved can make an important contribution to 
management practice (Gotsi and Andriopoulos, 2007).  
 
While there may be broad agreement over the importance of rebranding, there remains less of a 
consensus over its actual definition.  Some such as Merrilees and Miller (2008) define corporate 
rebranding as ‘..the disjunction or change between an initially formulated corporate brand and a 
new formulation.’ (p. 538). They maintain that such an exercise typically requires a fundamental 
revision of the organisation’s existing brand combined with a change management programme 
that elicits a shift in the cultural mindset of all staff.  
 
Others such as Muzellec and Lambkin (2006) argue that the process of rebranding may not 
always require this form of ‘revolutionary’ change and the exercise may require a more 
‘evolutionary’ approach.  Evolutionary developments may be characterized as leading to fairly 
minor changes in the company’s market position.  Adjustments can be quite subtle and involve 
modifications to the brand or an amendment to an existing slogan.  Some changes may be so 
slight that they are not appreciated or acknowledged by certain stakeholders.  In contrast, 
‘revolutionary’ rebranding represents a more radical change in the company’s positioning and 
may be more akin to the process identified by Merrilees and Miller (2008).  It may involve the 
creation of a new company name, new corporate brand vision or new brand values (see also 
Hatch and Schultz, 2003).  However neither strategy is independent of the other and both are 
seen as being at either end of a continuum of change (Muzellec and Lambkin, 2006). 
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What defines corporate rebranding is not just the scale of the exercise but where the change takes 
place.  For example, Muzellec and Lambkin (2008) identify that a rebranding strategy may occur 
at one of three levels; 
 Corporate Level – signifying change across the entire organisation; 
 Strategic Business Unit Level – applying the principles of rebranding to a specific 
division or subsidiary within the organisation; 
 Product Level –changes to the product brand name or specific product categories. 
 
Gotsi and Andriopoulos (2007) maintain the majority of academic studies have been concerned 
with product and category change and while common issues can be identified across the different 
levels, a number of fundamental differences also exist.  For example, it is maintained that 
corporate rebranding is more interdisciplinary in nature, ignores features specifically associated 
with the product and requires the organisation to be more explicitly featured in the process 
(Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000).  In order to realign an organisation’s new strategic vision, 
close cooperation is required between a variety of departments and functions. Senior individuals 
may be tasked with managing the expectations of the multiple stakeholders affected and as a 
consequence, need to be much more sensitive to the wide spectrum of attitudes that may exist 
(Hankinson 2009; Merrilees and Miller 2008).  This in turn may require a broader, more holistic 
communications strategy as traditional marketing methods cannot be relied upon to engender 
such fundamental change (Gotsi and Andriopoulos, 2007; Walter 2010).  
 
At the corporate level, Muzellec and Lambkin (2006; 2009) further distinguish between a 
branded house strategy and a house of brands strategy.  The former refers to a strategy where all 
divisions and subsidiaries are branded under a single corporate name, while the latter refers to a 
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holding company with a collection of different brand names.  For example, in the UK retail 
context, Tesco operates a portfolio of different formats under a single brand name (Tesco Extra, 
Tesco Superstore, Tesco Express, Tesco Homeplus, Tesco Metro).  In contrast, the Kingfisher 
Group operate a number of separate strategic business units each with their own identifiable 
brand identity (B&Q, Castorama, Brico Depot, Screw Fix, Koctas and Hornbach).  Muzellec and 
Lambkin (2008) also note however that not all companies fit neatly into such categories and that 
an organisation’s branding strategy often tends towards one approach or the other. 
 
Rebranding is also acknowledged to be an expensive process that carries with it a high degree of 
reputation risk.  For example, if an organisation embarks on a form of revolutionary rebranding 
that signals a fundamental shift in its market position, there remains the danger that the brand 
values and brand equity that have been created over many years, may be lost. (Muzellec and 
Lambkin 2006).  This point is reiterated by Merrilees and Miller (2008) who note that while 
there is always pressure to ensure the contemporary relevance of the brand, all its previous 
values should not be abandoned if a rebranding exercise is undertaken.  They maintain that such 
values are important in reaffirming the legacy and establishing the legitimacy of the new brand 
to customers.  
 
Given the costs and potential risks involved in a corporate rebranding exercise, it is valid to 
examine under what circumstances such an activity may be undertaken.   Gotsi and 
Andriopoulos (2007) note that rebranding may be seen as a natural step in an organisation’s 
evolution and a necessary response to changing market circumstances.  The requirement to 
sustain its contemporary relevance in the competitive marketplace acts as the primary driving 
force for a business.  At the same time, Miller and Merrilees, (2011) note that a rebranding 
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strategy may be triggered as a reaction to trading under-performance, acquisition and merger or 
in response to a declining, damaged or underperforming brand. For example, Lambkin and 
Muzellec’s (2008 and 2011) studies illustrated how a rebranding strategy was used to rationalise 
and integrate a complex set of businesses that had been accumulated through acquisition.  
Although they noted that such an exercise can sometimes be considered as an afterthought, one 
outcome of the rebranding process was an increase in the overall brand equity of the 
organisation.  
 
Once decided upon, a rebranding exercise requires careful planning as the process often involves 
a change to the organisation’s cultural norms (Kapferer, 1997).  For this reason, it is important to 
establish realistic timescales as a failure to address the temporal dimension can lead to failure in 
the rebranding process.  While some maintain that a rebranding exercise can be performed 
overnight (Kaikati, 2003) other such as Gotsi and Andriopoulos (2007) maintain the process 
cannot be rushed and that sufficient time must be given in order to fully communicate and 
engage with stakeholders.  
 
The more radical the rebranding, the higher the cost, the greater the degree of risk and the more 
time required in order to achieve the necessary transformations (Stuart and Muzellec, 2004; 
Gotsi and Andriopoulos, 2007).  Gotsi et al (2008) in particular note the importance of 
strategically aligning the culture of the organisation with its espoused brand values and it 
remains important for a company to remain respectful of the internal values and assumptions that 
guide its behavioural norms.  At the same time however they note the difficulties that belie the 
successful implementation of any cultural realignment programme. Not only is the company 
likely to face the prospect of competing organisational sub-cultures and individuals resistant to 
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change, such transformations will often require changes in the attitudes and behaviour of staff 
members (see also Hankinson 2009; Vallaster and de Chernatony 2006). 
 
While an organisation may approach the process of corporate rebranding in a number of different 
ways, Miller and Merrilees (2011) advocate a holistic approach that incorporates three phases.   
 Phase 1: Re-visioning the Corporate Brand includes identifying the factors (or triggers) 
that led to the re-branding process. 
 Phase 2: Achieving Stakeholder Buy-In to the Revised Corporate Brand focuses upon 
achieving buy in from both external as well as internal groups. 
 Phase 3: Corporate Branding Strategy Implementation focuses upon managing the 
communication process and aligning the brand with its the operational and functional 
components (such as store design, displays and product packaging). 
 
Against each of these phases Miller and Merrilees (2011) apply their previously constructed 
rebranding principles (Table One) and argue that Principles 1-3 are consistent with Phase 1 of 
the process, Principle 4 aligns with Phase 2 and finally Principles 5 and 6 are commensurate with 
Phase 3.   
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Table 1: Principles and Phases of Corporate Rebranding 
 Principle One A balance should be created between 
the core ideology while at the same 
time progressing the brand so it 
remains contemporarily relevant.  
 
Principle Two Rebranding may require some core 
concepts be retained as a bridge 
between the old and revised brand   
Phase One 
Principle Three Rebranding requires the organization 
to meet the needs of new market 
segments relative to supporting 
existing segments 
 
Principle Four Effective corporate rebranding requires 
communication, training and internal 
marketing 
Phase Two 
Principle Five Each element of the marketing mix 
needs to be aligned to the rebranding 
strategy 
Phase Three 
Principle Six Promotion is needed to make 
stakeholders aware of the revised 
brand. 
 
Source: abridged from Merrilees and Miller (2008; 2011) 
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Table One is of particular value to this research as it helps identify the conceptual limitations of 
the current literature and the reasons why further theoretical development is required.  Plewa et 
al (2011) maintain that the majority of academic research concentrates upon 'why' rebranding 
occurs rather than attempting to understand 'how' it manifests itself in practice. As a 
consequence, many case studies focus upon Phase One of the rebranding process and, while 
Phases Two and Three are acknowledged, the level of detail and discourse is often constrained. 
This in turn limits the opportunity to further conceptually develop the rebranding literature.  For 
example, while Lambkin and Muzellec (2011) identify that rebranding can be used to integrate a 
complex set of businesses after acquisition, how this actually operates in practice is not 
examined.  Similarly Miller and Merrilees (2011) comment upon the specific challenges of 
overcoming a declining brand when multiple stakeholders are involved.  How consensus is 
reached in the absence of a single brand owner, how conflictual relationships are managed and 
the critical factors that determine a successful outcome are not addressed.  
 
This paper attempts to partially rectify this acknowledged gap in the case literature by addressing 
all three of Miller and Merilees (2011) phases. The rebranding of the co-operative movement is 
detailed from the initial conceptualisation to the eventual roll out and, given its federal structure, 
the issues surrounding the management of multiple stakeholders will be examined. In so doing, 
the research will not only add to the limited 'practice orientated' rebranding literature, but should 
as Merilees and Miller's (2011:300) maintain, seek: 
 
  "... to reinforce this framework, modify it or replace it with a superior conceptualisation."   
 
14 
 
3. Context 
The historical development of the co-operative movement in the UK is well documented (Davis 
and Worthington,1993; Davies and Burt 2007) and has its origins in the need to protect 
consumers against exploitative food practices in the 1800s.  Although co-operative retail 
societies were originally established to supply basic foodstuffs and distribute trading surpluses to 
its membership, the range of activities quickly grew to include wholesale redistribution, 
manufacture, shipping, banking and insurance (Wilkinson and Balmer 1996). While the 
principles of open membership, political neutrality and democratic control were unifying themes, 
societies traditionally remained independent of each other and were responsible for setting their 
own aims and objectives.  Davies and Burt (2007) argue that while consumer co-operatives can 
be distinguished from market based organisations, the desire not to compete with other societies 
combined with a fragmented system of decision making and a focus upon local market outcomes 
have undermined their competitiveness and limited their growth (see also Hallsworth and Bell 
2003). 
 
Therefore, despite the movement in the United Kingdom having a combined turnover of £33.2 
billion in 2010 (Co-operatives UK, 2011), it has continued to experience a decline in its trading 
performance since the latter half of the twentieth century (Birchall 2000; Davies and Burt 2007; 
Quinn and Sparks 2007; Sparks 1994).  Not only has the period witnessed a fall in the 
movement’s overall market share, many societies have been compelled to merge or face closure 
(Hallsworth and Bell, 2003). By 2010 there were only fourteen consumer co-operatives with an 
annual turnover of more than £10 million operating in the UK (Co-operatives UK, 2011). 
However not all societies have struggled in the competitive marketplace.  The Co-operative 
Group (tCG), (formerly known as the CWS) is the world’s largest consumer co-operative with 
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operating profits of £606 million in 2010 (Co-operative Group, 2011).  It employs over 110,000 
people across a portfolio of businesses that include food, funerals, pharmacies, travel, farming, 
property, banking, insurance, legal services and online electrical.  In 2009, tCG acquired the 
Somerfield food chain for £1.6 billion whilst also agreeing to mergers with the Britannia 
Building Society and the Plymouth and the South West Co-operative.   
 
While linked under the broad category of being a co-operative, many societies continue to reflect 
their historical foundations and have emphasised their independence and autonomy from each 
other.   For example, in the marketing arena many societies developed their own logos, fascias 
and promotional strategies and it was not until 1967 that the Co-operative Wholesale Society 
(C.W.S.), attempted for the first time to adopt a new umbrella symbol known as the ‘cloverleaf’ 
logo (Co-op News; 9 September 1967).  The development of a single symbol was according to 
Thomas, designed to be ‘applicable to all uses and applications’ and formed part of an overall 
marketing strategy to ‘improve the accepted image of the whole movement.’ (Co-op News; 9 
September 1967,  p1).  It was hoped that the independent co-operative societies would see the 
value of a centrally developed umbrella brand and consequently support its adoption.  However 
success was limited with many societies choosing to resist what they considered to be a strategy 
imposed upon them and as the Report of the Co-operative Commission acknowledged over three 
decades later ‘a number of core businesses are marketed without reference to the Co-op brand’ 
(2001, p32).   
 
The Co-operative Retail Trading Group (CRTG) was established by the CWS and three 
independent societies in 1993 to act as a centralised buying function for all member co-
operatives. However it was not until 2002 that the last two independent societies applied for 
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membership and, reflecting the autonomy that had underpinned their historical development, 
many of those trading under the Co-operative banner continued to use a variety of symbols to 
represent their businesses (Murphy 2004).  These ranged from a wheat sheaf to a pair of clasped 
hands with little evidence to indicate any shared values or outlook between the different 
societies.  This fragmented development has served to both limit and dilute the impact of its 
brand (Birchall 2000).   
 
By the end of the twentieth century there was still no single Co-operative brand and senior 
members of various co-operative societies began voicing their concerns over the future of the 
movement and the need to halt the continuing decline in trading performance. It was at this stage 
that a co-operative delegation, including the Chief Executives of the CWS and the independent 
Oxford, Swindon and Gloucester Co-operative Societies approached the then Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair.  The request was to set up a second Co-operative Commission, to undertake a 
fundamental review of the sector and propose ways to modernize and develop the movement in 
the 21
st
 century.   As a result, Prime Minister Tony Blair, announced in 2000 that a Co-operative 
Commission would be established to take an independent evaluation of the sector.  He noted: 
 
‘I am pleased to respond to your request to help set up and sponsor a Commission …. I 
agree with your desire to modernize the co-operative movement  .. and to support your 
desire for a fundamental review’ (quoted in Co-operative Commission Report p.10) 
 
It was this review that signalled the start of the Co-operative rebranding exercise. 
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4. Methodology 
 
Brownlie and Saren (1997) identified the limitations of conventional representations of market 
management and noted how the rhetoric of managerial discourse gathered through empirical 
research, required careful scrutiny.  They maintained that academics needed to move beyond the 
literal interpretation of the interview in order to fully explore organisational processes and work 
practices.  Marketing researchers therefore need to engage in fieldwork that contextualises and 
triangulates the various narratives that are obtained. To respond to this and to fully detail the 
process of corporate rebranding a qualitative methodology, divided into three stages was deemed 
most appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
During the first phase of secondary data collection, access was provided to internal 
documentation as well as archive material from the Co-operative Group and Co-operatives UK, 
(the trade association of the co-operative movement).  In addition, permission was sought and 
granted to access the private records and minutes of a member of the actual Co-operative 
Commission.   
 
The materials gathered at this stage of the research included presentations from senior Brand 
Managers, newsletters and numerous communications to management, staff and elected 
members, committee minutes as well as public relations articles.   As part of the on-going 
attempt to communicate with stakeholders an exhibition had been erected in the Co-operative 
Group’s head office.  This detailed the reasons and rationale for the rebranding processes as well 
as well as highlighting the need for a coherent brand identity across the movement. Full access 
and copies of all exhibition material was made available to the researchers.  The usefulness of 
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secondary research in identifying emergent themes has been noted (Parker 2008) and the 
information provided at this stage helped facilitate the development of an appropriate line of 
enquiry.    
 
The second phase of the research comprised a series of nine semi structured interviews with 
senior management and directors from across the co-operative movement.  These individuals 
were selected on the basis of their active participation during key stages of the rebranding 
process. In order to provide a cross section of views, representatives were interviewed from 
independent societies, the Co-operative Group, the Co-operative Commission and the Brand 
Panel.  Reflecting the structure of the co-operative movement many of those interviewed had 
occupied a variety of different roles during the period under study.  This enabled them to 
comment upon more than one stage in the corporate rebranding process.  Table Two highlights 
the respective responsibilities and involvement of interviewees in the rebranding process. 
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Table 2: Interviewees for the second stage of the research 
 
 
Member of 
Co-op 
Commission 
Member of 
Brand Panel 
CWS or Co-
operative 
Group Director 
 
 
CWS or Co-
operative 
Group Chair 
Independent 
Society Chief 
Executive 
Co-operative 
Group 
employee 
Interviewee 1       
Interviewee 2        
Interviewee 3        
Interviewee 4       
Interviewee 5       
Interviewee 6       
Interviewee 7       
Interviewee 8       
Interviewee 9       
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During this phase, over 15 hours of qualitative research material was logged with the majority of 
interviews undertaken at tCG Head Office or at the interviewee’s place of business.  The length 
of the initial interviews ranged between 50 and 90 minutes.  This number was deemed sufficient 
as by the end of the interviews recurrent themes and issues were being identified (Ahrens and 
Dent 1998; Strauss and Corbin 1988).  
 
The final phase of the research involved a series of follow-up, qualitative, face-to-face interviews 
with individuals working across the co-operative movement.  These included middle and senior 
management as well as democratically elected representatives drawn from Area Committees and 
Regional Boards.  These interviews built upon the previous stage of the research and were 
primarily designed to answer specific strategic and operational aspects of the rebranding exercise 
(see also Provera et al 2010) which had been identified in the initial interviews and in so doing, 
confirm the accuracy of the information supplied. Individuals were chosen on the basis of their 
particular knowledge, responsibility or involvement in the process and, in a number of instances 
were recommended by interviewees from the second stage of the research.  A total of 20 semi 
structured interviews were conducted in this phase of the research.  
 
As the research sought to overcome some of the noted conceptual limitations identified in 
previous studies (Merillees and Miller 2011; Plewa et al 2011) all data were analysed using 
directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).  Using existing theories of rebranding, key 
concepts therefore provided the initial coding categories.  Because respondents in Stage Two 
occupied a number of different roles, each individual was asked to narrate their own personal 
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experiences and elaborate where necessary. Each interview was transcribed and initially read by 
both researchers.  Both parties independently assigned the collected  data to each of the pre-
determined categories and any data that could not be allocated was assigned a new category. 
These fragmented narratives were then used to construct an understanding of the rebranding 
process and obtain a sense of the 'whole' (Tesch 1990).  As Lindebaum and Cassell (2012) note, 
through an iterative process of reading and re-reading the collected data, the aim of this approach 
is to take fragments of data and construct a storyline that provided a collective coherence. Such 
an approach is also consistent with the work of Currie and Brown (2003) and Ylijoki (2005).   
 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) note the possibility of creating bias in directed content analysis by 
assigning data to pre-existing categories rather than develop new, more appropriate groupings.  
To avoid this situation and ensure the accuracy of the collected data, the researchers went back to 
four individuals from the Stage Two interviews.  These respondents were asked expand upon 
specific points raised in the initial interviews, reaffirm specific facts and confirm the accuracy of 
the information supplied.  In addition, two of the interviewees were also asked to comment upon 
initial drafts of the paper.  
 
While a qualitative approach to this form of investigation was considered most appropriate, there 
remain some noted limitations with the methodology employed.  The ten year period over which 
the rebranding exercise took place meant that interviewees recollections of the early stages of the 
rebranding process were sometimes limited.  While access to the secondary data partly 
ameliorated this situation, some details pertinent to the investigation are likely have been 
omitted. It is also acknowledged that a number of individuals were no longer connected with the 
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co-operative movement.  While the research attempted to interview persons directly involved in 
the rebranding process, some individuals remained untraceable or unavailable for comment. 
 
5. The rebranding process 
 
Attempting to develop a recognised and accepted corporate brand across a number of 
independent societies represents a significant and complex undertaking. To understand the 
primary strategic and operational issues that emerged, the following section first details the 
different stages involved in the co-operative rebranding process.  The research identifies nine 
(non-discrete) stages of development and details briefly each phase from the establishment of the 
Co-operative Commission in 2000, through to the monitoring of the brand re-launch in 2009 
(Table Three and Figure 1).  The narrative from the empirical research then allows a discussion 
of the major challenges, obstacles and tensions that arose over the course of the rebranding 
exercise. By identifying these issues and considering the means by which they were resolved 
allows a series the key themes to be considered in the final section.  
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Table 3: Stages in the Co-operative Rebranding Process 
Stage   
Stage 
One 
The Impetus for 
Change  
The Co-operative Commission was established in February 2000 
with twelve members comprising senior business leaders, 
politicians, trade unionists as well as representatives from the co-
operatives themselves 
Stage 
Two: 
The Creation of a 
Brand Panel 
Composed of seven representatives from independent co-
operative societies, a representative from Co-operatives UK and 
another from the non-retail co-operative sector.  In addition there 
were six representatives from the Co-operative Group including 
a lay representative from the elected membership.    
  A Working Party was also formed to support the Brand Panel 
and to oversee the development and management of the new 
brand plus five 'Brand Standards Workstreams' to ensure 
consistency of implementation across the different businesses. 
Stage 
Three:    
The Physical 
Elements of the 
Brand  
The translation of the brand model into tangible output.  
Determining what the new Co-operative brand would look like, 
how to communicate to stakeholders, and the standards that were 
to accompany any re-launch. 
Stage 
Four 
Aligning 
Operational 
Standards 
Representatives from the largest societies in each business sector 
along with key operations management from tCG are tasked with 
developing ‘best practice’ in stores and outlets. Focus is upon 
three areas customer experience; brand operating practices and 
procedures and the customer offer. 
Stage 
Five: 
Brand Pilot Tests The new Co-operative brand is tested across a representative 
sample of locations, businesses and societies. A Brand Pilot 
assesses change against a series of key criteria and helps 
determines whether the brand could be successfully implemented 
across all societies and business sectors within the Co-operative 
movement.   
Stage 
Six 
Assessing Brand 
Pilot Outcomes 
The Pilot stores and branches are compared against a control 
group of stores as well as a range of financial and non financial 
criteria. 
Stage 
Seven 
Preparation for 
Brand Re-launch 
The process of changing all of business units to the new brand, 
refurbishing stores and repackaging and re-launching own brand 
products. 
Stage 
Eight 
Brand Launch An integrated communications campaign that utilised a broad 
range of conventional media including press, cinema and 
billboards, direct marketing and point of sale material in all co-
operative stores and businesses as well as online and social 
media.   
Stage 
Nine 
Post Launch 
Performance 
An evaluation of the rebranding exercise against a series of 
performance indicators, including sales, new members and 
customer footfall. 
Source: Authors Research 
24 
 
Figure 1: Timelines for the Rebranding Process 
Stage   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
              
1 Impetus for change   Commission Report Published 2001 
2 Creation of a Brand 
Panel 
   
Established 2002 Panel Continues to meet to address issues 
3 Physical elements of 
the Brand  
   
Brand Working Panel 
 
4 Aligning Operational 
Standards 
   
        Brand Workstreams 
 
5 Brand Pilot Tests     
                                                                        Sept. 2005 - Sept 2006         
6 Assessing Brand Pilot 
Outcomes 
   
                                                                                  Jan 2006 - Dec 2007         
7 Preparation for Brand 
Re-launch 
   
                                                                                              Board Approval July 2006  
8 Brand Re-launch    
                                                                                                                                                Launch 2009 
9 Post Launch 
Performance 
 
   
                                                                                                                                            Evaluation begins                                                                                                                                            
immediately upon launch 
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Stage One: The Impetus for Change  
 
One of the primary motivations for the rebranding exercise was the realisation amongst many 
members that the movement was underperforming and as a consequence, vulnerable to 
competitive pressures. As one member of the Co-operative Commission noted: 
‘The call for such a complete review worked in 2001 because there were far fewer 
societies (there were 932 societies in 1958) and the CWS was now the largest retailer.  
However, a number of senior people in the independent societies also saw the need for 
change. There was a realisation in the larger societies that something had to happen to 
deal with the spiral of decline. There was a need for strategic vision for the movement to 
move ahead. The threat of demutualisation helped to focus their minds. There was a 
realisation that a successful, engaged business was less threatened…   The movement 
was not seen to be a modern organisation.’ 
 
After sitting for less than a year, the Report of the Commission was published in January 2001 
with 60 separate recommendations on subjects ranging from recruitment to lifelong learning (Co-
operative Commission 2001). The Report also made a number of key proposals concerning the 
rejuvenation of the Co-operative brand and the creation of a shared identity in order to improve 
the movement’s commercial performance (Recommendations 16 -21).   
 
Crucially, the Report recommended that a ‘Co-operative Brand Panel should be established to 
develop a common national Co-operative branding approach for the Movement’ 
(Recommendation 17.1).   
 
One CEO of an independent society and former Group Chair noted the importance of the 
Commission’s Report. It was seen to play an important legitimising role and added to the 
argument that a more ‘business like’ approach was required. As he identified: 
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‘The Commission’s Report tipped the scales and made it easier for those who wanted a 
national brand’  
 
However it was also added that the legitimacy of the Brand Project had been founded upon: 
‘very extensive research to ensure that this would be based upon the wants of the 
customer and not the likes and dislikes of any individuals (or the wants of individual 
societies).’ 
 
By defining the scale of the exercise and embedding this in empirical research helped manage 
the multiple stakeholders involved in the process and assisted with early decision making. For 
example, questions were initially raised as to whether other enterprises such as worker or 
agricultural co-operatives should be included.   The subsequent decision not to include them was 
based in part upon findings that highlighted the complexity of rebranding across so many sectors 
and individual businesses.  
 
Stage Two: The Creation of a Brand Panel 
 
The development of a corporate brand capable of meeting the needs and expectations of a wide 
range of stakeholders required members of the Brand Panel to mirror the Commission’s Report 
and transcend their personal interests and those of their own organisation.   
 
Although the Commission had attempted to define the parameters of the rebranding exercise the 
research revealed that there still remained some uncertainty about the scope of the ‘brand 
project’, with different people assigning different interpretations to the Report.  In particular, in 
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the early stages views ranged from relatively modest (evolutionary) changes (such as ‘tweaks to 
the cloverleaf logo or a new shop fascia) to a more fundamental (revolutionary) regeneration of 
the brand.  
 
These seemingly polarised opinions were partly mediated and resolved through empirical 
research. As one Brand Panel member noted: 
 
 ‘It was the weight of research that stopped any arguments during this time.  There was 
an analytical approach. The research showed that the Cloverleaf logo was disliked.  This 
was not a startling discovery to some, as earlier research 5 or 6 years before had shown 
that the cloverleaf was not well perceived. Nevertheless, the process adopted helped the 
Brand Panel to make difficult decisions.  It allowed them to move step by step towards a 
common desire for an overarching brand.’  
 
The objective was to differentiate the Co-operative from the competition by creating a distinctive 
set of brand components designed to become the pillars upon which the business would be built 
and help establish a vision for the brand (Table Four).  One respondent noted the importance of 
compromise during this stage of the process and the need to ‘keep the bigger picture in mind’.  
For example, when one society objected to the use of the term Dividend (an identifiable term 
amongst co-operative members) the component was toned down to Rewarding.  
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Table 4: Co-operative Brand Components 
  
Championing A Co-operative business makes things better for its 
customers by creating, pioneering and implementing 
innovative and socially responsible ideas that lead its 
industry. 
Community A Co-operative business builds a close relationship with its 
customers by being there for them, reflecting their needs and 
contributing to their community. 
Rewarding A Co-operative business offers a welcoming, pleasing and 
rewarding experience. It does something worthwhile with its 
profits, leaving customers feeling they’ve well by both 
themselves and others. 
Trustworthy 
 
A Co-operative business is honest, open and fair with its 
customers, behaving with integrity at all times, and being 
expert and accountable at what it does. 
Consistent  
quality 
A Co-operative business gives its customers good quality 
products and great service at a fair price, wherever and 
whenever they use it. 
Source: The Co-operative Exhibition (2009) 
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Once the components of the brand were agreed, they were distilled down to provide a single 
statement of what the brand offered – a brand proposition. This was the core message that 
needed to be consistent across all businesses and was designed to appeal to both new and 
potential customers.  The Brand Proposition that the panel adopted was:  ‘Successful business 
with integrity’. 
 
Once the brand proposition was agreed, the ‘personality of the brand’ or those characteristics 
which could be used to describe the brand to both customers and staff could be determined.  The 
traits that the Panel decided upon were: open, decent, ambitious, friendly, healthy and co-
operative.  Finally, a decision was made on the ‘brand essence’, this provided a single thought 
that was deemed to be at the core of the brand.  The Panel decided upon – Changing business for 
good.  Figure One details how these elements were combined into a Co-operative Brand Model.  
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Figure 2. The Co-operative Brand Model 
 
Source:  The Co-operative Brand Experience Exhibition 2009  
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Stage Three:   The Physical Elements of the Brand  
 
As noted previously, the co-operative movement had never fully embraced a single brand 
identity.  Consequently any attempt to create something acceptable to all societies and across all 
businesses was unlikely to be straight forward.  As a way of helping to overcome the anticipated 
resistance, the Brand Panel commissioned further research into perceptions of the brand as well 
as consulting widely with stakeholders.   
 
The results identified that whilst consumers found ‘The Co-op’ to elicit connotations of 
‘packaged groceries’ and ‘limp lettuce’, the name ‘The Co-operative’ was seen to leverage on 
the movement’s heritage and traditional values.  Using ‘The Co-operative’ as the brand identity 
was therefore seen to provide a positive statement of intent as it represented the movement’s way 
of doing business.  It was at this stage, that the decision was made to finally abandon the 
cloverleaf logo, develop a new corporate colour scheme and adopt the ‘Co-operative’ name as 
the master brand. 
 
Some members of the Brand Panel expressed reservations with this strategy, maintaining instead 
that improvements could still be made to the existing designs. One member of the Brand 
Management team highlighted the dilemma that was felt at the time:  
The ‘cloverleaf’ was thought to be a unifying symbol but it was primarily used in food 
stores and very little elsewhere.   ‘…..  It was being used during the 1990s in the 
businesses that seemed to be struggling…. but without the ‘cloverleaf’ levels of 
recognition fell even further.  The use of the ‘cloverleaf’ created conflict in some, 
regarding its association with a declining co-operative movement.  
32 
 
 
However it was also noted that even co-operative businesses operating in same sector had used 
different fascias. For example in food, the movement operated under the Welcome, Late Shop, 
and Swift banners.  As the former Head of Brand noted: 
‘It {the Cloverleaf} had been altered by borders, additional wording, colour etc.  We 
were abusing the format.  The use of words such as Welcome was an attempt to soften the 
cloverleaf as it was seen to be weak.  Within the CWS, specialist retail had moved away 
from it towards Funeralcare and Travelcare etc and the Co-op bank never used it.’ 
 
While these weaknesses were acknowledged, a number of reservations were still raised over the 
notion of single unified brand. For example, individual elements within tCG were concerned that 
the brand might be tarnished by other, less professional co-operative businesses and openly 
questioned whether it was necessary for all parts of the movement to look the same.   
 
In contrast, smaller independent societies voiced their concerns about the loss of their local 
identity and the ‘lack of respect’ shown towards their businesses.  It was feared that replacing 
identifiable local fascias with national corporate symbols would remove an important link to the 
community and as a consequence, a source of differentiation.  As one independent society 
member noted: 
‘The original brand standards were far too rigid and inflexible, alienating independent 
societies who saw this as a subtle way of ‘removing’ some of their independence, by 
making their stores appear like clones of ‘Big Brother’ i.e. the Co-operative Group’ 
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The research revealed that progress at this stage could only be achieved through compromise. 
While all exterior signage and fascias were replaced in order to create a consistent master brand, 
the design made (modest) provision for independent co-operative societies to be able to identify 
their outlets.   The brand identity was also applied to merchandising and promotional items in 
order to create visual coherence across the businesses.  This covered elements such as in-store 
signage and decor, trolley handles, carrier bags, A-frames, POS, dump bins, ticket wallets, 
carrier bags and name tags.  
 
Even after these concessions some resistance was still experienced by those who felt that the new 
offer represented a retrograde step in terms of standards and design. As one respondent 
commented: 
 
‘They {the brand standards} lacked any cohesion in terms of an overall store design 
package and were simply inferior to the design standards that were being operated by the 
more switched on independent societies. So why on earth would they wish to ‘switch’ to a 
poorer standard of interior design than they already had?’ 
 
What emerges from this stage of the research is that even after consultation and communication 
with the movement’s numerous different interest groups, it was not possible to overcome all 
levels of resistance.  Nevertheless it was recognised by the Brand Panel that a successful 
rebranding exercise was predicated upon the active engagement of the various stakeholder 
groups and the creation of mock-up stores and displays at roadshow events allowed a wide cross 
section of views to be considered.   
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Stage Four: Aligning Operations and Standards 
 
It was realised by the Brand Panel that a successful rebranding exercise required a holistic 
approach and co-operation across the movement.  In particular the redesign and reformulation of 
the Co-operative’s visual identity needed to be matched by the delivery of consistent standards in 
all branches and stores.  To achieve this required a focus upon and, if necessary a re-alignment 
of, other functions and departments. 
 
An example where re-alignment was necessary was provided by two interviewees. In a number 
of locations across the UK co-operative societies had traditionally competed against each other. 
Although part of the wider movement they had different operating procedures, merchandise 
layouts and loyalty schemes. As one respondent highlighted: 
‘..if two societies trading in the same town have identical looking shop front fascias and 
internal décor (to brand standard) and then adopt the same membership card, how on 
earth do people appreciate that the apparently ‘same’ membership card entitles them to a 
completely different level of dividend to their neighbour?’ 
 
Similarly another CEO of an independent society commented: 
 
 
‘If we were to adopt a national brand, with other co-operative stores near to our own 
showing the same fascia as ours, it would be almost impossible for our members to know 
where our unique offers were to be found.  As it is now they can recognise our distinctive 
fascia and style.  I can only imagine the irritation and disaffection we would engender 
among our members if we caused such confusion.  That would be in nobody’s interests. 
The brand could work well where one society trades in one area, e.g. the Channel Islands 
or if the offer is identical in each society.  We have neither of these features.’ 
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It was further noted that this confusion could be compounded where individuals were members 
of both societies and, as will be illustrated later, a failure to address such strategic issues can 
contribute to a delay in the rebranding process. 
 
From the beginning of the rebranding project it was recognized that a cultural as well as 
structural re-alignment had to occur in order to better reflect the movement’s new brand values.  
At the branch and store level, this meant achieving standards via an agreed set of performance 
indicators.  These were benchmarks based upon competitor research and the perceived future 
standards required for the businesses. The ‘customer offer’ and ‘brand operational standards’ 
were measured internally as part of the brand sign up agreement
iii
 whilst ‘customer experience 
standards’ were measured by an independent mystery shopping and audit programme. 
 
As one former Marketing Director from the movement noted: 
 
‘This was the largest rebranding programme in UK retail – a massive undertaking. It 
was a cultural shift. {What was} Often missed was the behind-the-line strategy to get the 
100k staff to understand what was happening.’ 
 
To help staff engage and convey these values to customers they began to receive regular 
communications through a Brand Newsletter and the Co-operative membership magazine. More 
directly, the movement created a ‘Brand Experience’ training programme which was designed to 
communicate how important rebranding was to the Co-operative, what was involved, what were 
the expected behaviours and the importance of working together.  In order to provide a 
benchmark, the engagement of colleagues was initially measured and later compared once the 
training had been completed and the business units rebranded.  
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Stage Five:   Brand Pilot Tests  
 
Between September 2005 and September 2006, pilot tests were carried out across a group of 42 
outlets using four different retail societies.  The key objective of these tests was to gauge 
consumer understanding and recognition of the new brand and their proclivity to try the new 
offer.   A series of key performance indicators permitted the business performance of the pilot 
stores to be compared against a control group of outlets. This list of measurable criteria varied 
across the businesses but included sales, prescription volumes and new account volumes, 
customer transactions, bookings and footfall as well as average basket spend.   
 
All pilot outlets were also independently audited using mystery shoppers (this was the first time 
that a consistent method for measuring operational procedures had been agreed across the 
societies). In addition, the level of colleague engagement within the pilot units was also 
compared to staff in other stores across the movement.  
 
Stage Six: Assessing Brand Pilot Outcomes 
 
The pilots established that the commercial benefits that stemmed from rebranding varied 
between different business sectors with food, pharmacy and travel stores outperforming the 
control groups in terms of the number of customers and total transactions. Across these stores an 
average sales uplift of 10% over a normal refit was identified, however the trading benefits for 
both the Co-operative Bank and its funeral businesses were much more limited.  
 
37 
 
The research noted two implications stemming from the pilots. First, the results were seen to be 
enough to create an impetus for the exercise to be continued, secondly, they helped address the 
concerns that some staff had about the process itself.  Respondents noted that seeing positive and 
tangible outcomes further legitimised the rebrand and helped to allay employee fears. 
 
Although acknowledged as crucial to the exercise, it was felt that financial measurements could 
not be seen as the sole determinants of success.  Such a view reinforces the work of Chaudhuri 
(2002) who noted the positive impact that factors such as corporate reputation and engagement 
could have upon brand performance.  The pilot research therefore examined whether the 
reputation of the movement had been enhanced by the rebranding exercise. Using its own 
Corporate Reputation Index, the pilot demonstrated that rebranding could deliver an 
improvement in how existing and potential customers perceived the co-operative movement. 
Similarly a staff ‘Engagement Index’ showed a higher level of colleague satisfaction in the pilot 
locations compared to elsewhere. Respondents in the pilot stores stated that they felt more 
valued, more committed and had greater pride in the business.  Interestingly the Index showed 
improvements from both Co-operative management as well as shop floor staff.  
 
 
Stage Seven:   Preparation for Brand Re-launch 
 
Following the completion of the Brand Pilot programme and an analysis of all the results, the 
Brand Panel recommended to the Board of Directors that a complete rebrand be undertaken 
across the co-operative movement.  The decision to re-launch was approved by the Board in July 
2006 with the first independent society, Midcounties Co-op confirming participation in 
September 2006.    
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Similarly tCG began the process of changing all of its business units to the new brand in early 
2007 with the implementation programme being intensified during 2008 and 2009.  All of the 
Group’s four and a half thousand business units were scheduled to be rebranded and refurbished 
by the end of 2010 (with the acquired Somerfield stores and Britannia branches following as 
soon as was practicable).   
 
Despite the improved trading figures it was also noted that the Brand Pilots did not overcome the 
concerns of all the independent societies about a loss of their trading identity. As one Brand 
Panel member explained:  
 
‘We were attempting to get to a position where the independent societies would come on 
board but many waited for the Co-operative Group to show that the Brand was 
successful.  The societies were being ‘cautious’ and were ‘waiting to see how it went’.  
There was some suspicion and surprise at the sales uplifts that were achieved.’   
 
As the rollout continued in 2007, other societies such as Lothian, Borders and Angus, Anglia and 
Radstock joined the rebranding programme. At the same time, the Scottish Midland Co-op (who 
had been part of the pilot) made the decision to play no further part in the re-launch.  Moreover 
one other co-operative undermined the whole notion of a single unified brand by deciding to 
selectively apply elements of the new visual identity (and choosing an alternative colour scheme 
for its external fascia).   
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Highlighting the holistic nature of the exercise, this stage of the rebranding process also saw an 
investment in other elements of the movement’s brand identity, for example, the repackaging and 
re-launch of its own brand products sold through CRTG. The Brand Panel had previously 
identified this as an issue of importance as the presence of these products in customers’ homes 
was central to the brand experience.  Whilst it had been impossible to revitalise all of the own 
brand products prior to the Pilot, this activity was given priority once the launch was confirmed.  
As a former Head of Co-op Brand noted: 
  
‘Own brands are very important in that they ‘touch’ consumers more often than shops 
do. Plus approx. 40% of all our grocery sales are own brand. It was not possible to 
repackage/ rebrand these for a limited number of pilot stores but once the full roll out 
began a lot of effort was put behind rebranding and revitalising the Co-operative own 
brand range of 3,000 products. Not only has this been important in changing consumer 
perceptions but also played a key part in helping other societies accept the new branding 
(as they got these products automatically through CRTG).’ 
 
Stage Eight: Brand Launch  
 
Initially the launch of the new Co-operative brand had been scheduled for the late Spring of 
2008, however the movement faced a strategic dilemma. It could not wait until every store and 
outlet had been refurbished, yet at the same time a premature brand launch would have 
undermined the integrity of the brand itself.  While all the communications were in place 
(including a major advertising campaign), the launch date was revised when it became apparent 
that less than half of the business units would have been refurbished to the required standards 
and the realignment of operations was not complete.  As one Group Director and Brand Panel 
member identified: 
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‘The biggest issue regarding time was that brand communications were divorced from 
operations. We were being driven by the readiness of the advert rather than whether 
operations were ready to deliver… We needed to avoid the increase in uncertainty and 
loss of trust when you have something is promised before it can be delivered.  This 
required the brand to be in the right position before the launch.  This was a big lesson – 
when operations drift away from Brand communications then you generate distrust’.   
 
The Co-operative Group’s Board of Directors took the view that a delay until the following year 
would result in a more significant proportion of businesses being brand compliant and would 
improve the likely success of the strategy. 
 
The Brand was formally launched to the public in February 2009 with a 2½ minute long national 
TV ad featuring Bob Dylan’s ‘Blowin’ in the Wind’.  The song, chosen to associate with the 
ethical stance of the co-operative contrasted starkly against the price-themed advertising evident 
during the early phase of the global recession.  As one Brand Panel member stated:  
 
‘It’s not a pure commercial advert, it’s talking about all the good things we do, climate 
change to fair-trade to community projects.’ 
 
In support of the national TV ad, an integrated communications campaign was designed to 
optimise the value of a £10 million television advert. This package utilised the broad range of 
conventional media including press, cinema and billboards, direct marketing and point of sale 
material in all co-operative stores and businesses as well as online and social media.  Designed 
for broad coverage, it also targeted more specific customer groups. Pre- launch activity had 
generated media interest in the use of Dylan’s song whilst employees and active members of the 
co-operative were encouraged to engage others using a viral text messaging campaign.  The 
initial media campaign was followed up by second and third waves in June and October 2009. 
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Stage Nine: Post Launch Performance 
 
Evaluating the impact of a rebranding project across an entire movement remains complex. The 
on-going process of store upgrades and refits meant that the exercise could not be benchmarked 
against a single start date.  Between 2006 and 2010 consumer co-operatives in the UK saw a 
23% in sales turnover and tCG itself saw its net profits increase by 31.5% (Co-operatives UK, 
2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007).  Over the same period however, the larger co-operative societies 
continued to dispose of unprofitable sections of their business as well as undertake a number of 
acquisitions.  Directly attributing improvements in the financial performance of the movement to 
the rebrand is therefore likely to carry a significant margin of error.   
 
Nevertheless it is noted that the brand value of The Co-operative grew from £400 million in 2007 
to £2.88 billion in 2010 (Costa, 2010) and the Corporate Reputation Index showed an 11 fold 
increase between 2006 and 2010 (Co-operatives Group 2010a).  In a review of the strongest 
consumer brands in the UK, it was noted that:  
 
‘Under the Masterbrand its family of businesses from food retail to financial services is 
experiencing a renaissance as consumers increasingly see the value in The Co-
operative’s integrity’ (Superbrands 2009 / 10)  
 
and 
‘The rebrand of the Somerfield estate and the merger of the Britannia Building Society 
with The Co-operative Financial Services have cemented the Co-operative as one of 
Britain’s strongest brands’ (Superbrands 2011). 
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In addition, tCG recruited almost three-quarters of a million new members and experienced a 
43% increase in the number of individuals trading with more than one of its businesses (source: 
Co-operative Press Release 11/09/2008; Co-operative Group, 2010b). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
   
Skålén (2009) maintained that marketing studies outside that of consumer research have lacked 
an empirical focus, this is despite the contribution that grounded research can make to explaining 
underlying structures, patterns of action and how particular outcomes are derived (see also 
Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009). In the context of this research, Plewa et al (2011) noted the 
limited number of case studies on rebranding and the tendency to focus upon 'why' rather than 
'how' rebranding occurs.  This is despite the acknowledgement that a practice based approach to 
brand building can provide useful managerial guidance (Järventie-Thesleff et al, 2010). 
 
This paper has attempted to partly address the gap in the literature by examining in detail the 
practices through which the UK co-operative movement was rebranded over a ten year period.  It 
was guided by the work of Miller and Merrilees (2011) who identified three phases of rebranding 
that are underpinned by a further six principles.  It will be argued in this final section that the 
results from this research not only provide new insights into the retail rebranding process they 
also help further refine this conceptual model.  
 
Declining market share, a loss of competitiveness and the closure of numerous societies are 
amongst the factors that led the co-operative movement to 'Re-vision' its corporate brand (Miller 
and Merrilees, 2011).  The challenge for the movement was to maintain their core ideology while 
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at the same time progressing the brand in order for it to remain contemporarily relevant. This 
research highlighted a deeply held set of beliefs that are of critical importance to many co-
operative members.  These principles both distinguish and influence the way in which the 
movement operates and, while this core ideology may represent a non-negotiable set of values, 
this case also identified the pressure that existed to progress the brand.  A dichotomy therefore 
exists between the brand heritage and the physical representation of the brand. While many 
consumers understood and identified with the key values of the movement, this was not 
translated into a contemporary perception of the product offer.   
 
While it was necessary to ensure that the traditional values and principles of the movement were 
embedded in the new brand strategy, there appeared to be little requirement to maintain a 
memory that linked to previous embodiments of the brand (and in particular the Cloverleaf).  
While Merrilees and Miller (2008) noted the importance of sustaining a nexus between the 
existing and revised brand, the historical development and autonomous structure of the co-
operative movement may help explain why this was considered less of a priority.  Previous 
attempts at developing a branded house strategy (Muzellec and Lambkin 2008) had met with 
limited success with societies providing numerous translations and interpretations of the various 
logos, fascias and emblems.  This lack of consistency across the movement meant that a coherent 
brand identity was not present and there was little impetus to carry forward the previous brand 
concepts. 
 
The role of effective communications remains a consistent theme in the rebranding literature and 
comprises one of the primary principles under the second of Miller and Merrilees' (2011) three 
phases.  This research illustrated that effective communications comprises a broader and more 
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multifarious set of activities than previously recognised.  For example, at the outset of the 
process the importance of independent empirical research was identified in both legitimising and 
directing rebranding activities.  The Report of the Commission and the information gathered by 
the Brand Panel not only provided direction and  helped reduce subjectivity, it provided the 
impetus for a more 'revolutionary' approach to the overall process (Muzellec and Lambkin 2006).  
 
At the same time, Järventie-Thesleff et al, (2010) noted the problems that stemmed from a top 
down process of implementation and the need to engage stakeholders was shown to be a central 
tenent of the co-operatives strategy. While there has been an almost universal and uncritical 
acceptance of the need to engage in this form of 'active co-construction' when rebranding, the 
research identified an unintended and limiting consequence of gaining such support. Gotsi and 
Andriopoulos (2007) discussed the temporal dimensions of rebranding and noted how some 
rebranding exercises have failed due to the limited time allocated to planning the transition 
process.  However in the case of the co-operative's rebranding exercise the need to reach 
agreement across the movement was identified as a key reason why it took almost ten years from 
conception to execution.  Although a more ambitious pace could have been set, the constant need 
to search for agreement and reach decisions through compromise was responsible for extending 
the process.  As a former Head of Brand noted: 
 
‘Throughout the development of the brand a significant emphasis was placed on 
stakeholder engagement, not least with retail co-operative societies across the UK. This 
was due to both the federal role/ nature of the Co-operative Group and the brand 
projects ultimate vision of a single consumer facing retail co-operative brand 
(irrespective of the number of owners/participants). Therefore an iterative approach was 
adopted to society engagement and consultation. This also ensured best practice was 
shared for the common good.’ 
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While Miller and Merrilees' (2011) third phase of corporate rebranding focused upon the 
implementation of strategy, the limited number of empirical studies that currently exist has 
constrained the further conceptual development of this stage in the process. The findings from 
this research partially rectify this by expanding upon and detailing the tasks involved.  It 
identifies six stages involved in implementation, from aligning operational standards through to 
post launch evaluation.  Moreover it was possible to identify rebranding activities undocumented 
in previous research.  For example, it was noted that brand consistency could not be achieved 
without a formal process of 'policing' and that any re-alignment of the marketing mix needed to 
be accompanied by a series of measures that guarded against significant deviations from agreed 
standards.  Given the importance assigned to human action in determining marketing outcomes, 
(Skålén and Hackley, 2010), the application of such centralised control measures, represents a 
logical, managerial initiative.  
 
Perhaps the most significant contribution made by this case is the insight it provides into the 
issues of compliance across a movement of loosely linked, independent societies with multiple 
identities, multiple stakeholders and multiple cultures.  Järventie-Thesleff et al, (2010) 
highlighted the complexities involved in brand alignment and noted how previous research has 
underestimated the strategic role employees play in interpreting and defining marketing 
outcomes. This would support Miller and Merrilees' (2011) contention that there is the need to 
fully understand how consensus is achieved when responsibility for brand ownership is shared 
across numerous individuals and organisations. This paper identified that achieving agreement 
across all parties is not only unlikely, it remains unnecessary in order for the strategy to progress.  
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Although it also acknowledges that the failure of stakeholders to engage does result in a dilution 
of the overall impact of the rebranding strategy. 
 
The reasons for non compliance are numerous, for example, while some societies feared a loss of 
‘local’ identity and wished to remain independent, others maintained that the established ‘brand 
standards’ were far too rigid and inflexible and that a ‘design by committee’ approach had led to 
poor decision making. Some other societies complained of a lack of engagement, maintaining 
that the consultation process had been inadequate and that they had not been fully involved.  As a 
consequence, the outcomes that were eventually derived from the rebranding exercise reflected 
these tensions. While some independent societies immediately engaged with the brand, others 
temporarily delayed the decision, selectively chose elements of the new identity or decided to 
take no further part. Such choices are not afforded under traditional notions of corporate 
rebranding. Fortunately those not wishing to be involved represented only a minority of co-
operative businesses (accounting for approximately 7% of turnover (Co-operative Review 2011)) 
and their ability to undermine the synergies inherent with a brand house strategy remained 
limited.  As Aaker and Joachimsthaler, (2000) note, to fully benefit from shared associations, 
there is a need for a consistent visual identity and coherence across all businesses (Muzellec and 
Lambkin, 2009; Merrilees and Miller, 2008; Vallaster and de Chernatony, 2006).   
 
Muzellec and Lambkin (2008) identified three levels of organisational rebranding and while 
many of the conditions that apply to a corporate exercise are evidenced in this case, a number of 
the challenges and outcomes remain unique to this type of organisational structure.  On the basis 
of the evidence presented in this paper, it can be suggested that a fourth level of ‘Federal 
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Rebranding’ exists where compromise and consensus are primary considerations and where, 
despite a prolonged period of consultation, adoption and acceptance are by no means guaranteed.  
 
While this case has essentially focused upon the co-operative movement and the challenges 
involved in rebranding across a federal structure, a broader, more general series of issues may 
also be derived from this study. The practice orientated approach adopted by the paper allows a 
number of practical implications to be drawn out that may in turn provide guidance for 
organisations wishing to embark upon a process of corporate rebranding (Table 5).   
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Table 5 Practical implications derived from the co-operative case 
Key Issue Comment 
Legitimacy 
 
Impetus for change should be fully endorsed by senior management and 
ideally supported by empirical evidence that highlights the need for change.  
Clarity of Brand 
Standards 
The Brand standards need to be clearly defined from the outset.  This will 
enable roll out, identify potential dilution and misinterpretation as well as 
facilitate future brand extensions.  
Timescales and 
resources 
Realistic timescales need to be set and adhered to. A formal planning process 
should allow the time necessary to achieve the desired cultural transformation.  
An overly protracted process will however result in a loss of organisational 
impetus as well as having resource implications.  
Focus Other strategic priorities are likely arise over the rebranding period.  There is 
a need to ensure that the process does not become sidelined and that the 
organisation remains committed to achieving its goals even when other 
strategic issues dominate. 
Communication 
and consensus 
While a clearly articulated communications strategy to all stakeholders is 
fundamental, gaining complete consensus across all parties is both unlikely 
and unnecessary. 
Brand Launch In the case of large multiple retailers, it is not necessary to have the entire 
store portfolio rebranded prior to the launch.  However continual delays in any 
refurbishment programme will ultimately impact upon the integrity of the new 
brand identity. 
Policing  While a successful rebranding strategy requires an investment in training and 
the communication of new standard operating procedures (SOPs) to all staff, 
this needs to be accompanied by a system of policing, monitoring and 
evaluation. 
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Finally, this case study has served to highlight the numerous gaps that continue to remain in our 
conceptual and practical understanding of the rebranding process.   At a strategic level, the extent 
to which other organisations experience stages and timelines similar to the co-operative 
movement remains uncertain.  Moreover, given the holistic nature of corporate rebranding and 
its emphasis upon interdisciplinary, cross functional co-operation, further research may be 
undertaken into the actual management process.  For example, how conflict is resolved and the 
means by which consensus is achieved may serve to inform marketing theory as well as provide 
practical managerial guidance. 
 
In conclusion therefore, the case evidence from this paper has both reinforced elements of the 
existing rebranding literature as well as further contributed to the theoretical debate. The positive 
trading performance of the rebranded stores together with research commissioned by the Co-
operative Group confirmed that the new brand had been well received by both customers and 
employees.   Such changes may well result in confirmation of a statement by Co-operative Group 
Chief Executive, Peter Marks (2009), ‘we are witnessing a renaissance of the Co-operative.’  
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i
 A co-operative is defined as a group of people acting together to meet the common needs and aspirations of its 
members, sharing ownership and making decisions democratically (Co-operative Group 2010a). 
ii
 A full description of these Principles may be found at: http://www.uk.coop/economy/values 
iii
 Only stores who had passed both forms of audit could 'sign up' for the new brand identity. 
 
